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In  the  past  ten  years  the  Peruvian  economy  has  experienced  important  structural  changes 
regarding  monetary  policy.  This  paper  focuses  on  the  bank  lending  channel  as  part  of  the 
transmission process to macroeconomic activity in the Peruvian economy based on Bernanke, 
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996) flight-to-quality argument. The purpose of this paper is to identify 
the bank lending channel (using bank level data), and test its relevance for understanding the 
transmission to economic activity by comparing monetary policy effects under two scenarios 
with and without a bank lending channel operating (using structural autoregressive vectors.) As 
in Gambacorta (2005), I consider a sample period in which a policy variable can capture the 
monetary policy stance of the central bank. For the case of Peru, I conclude that the bank 
lending channel has operated but this channel is not important for identifying the transmission 
process from monetary policy to macroeconomic activity. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In the past ten  years, the Peruvian  economy has experienced different monetary 
policy changes. One of those policy changes is the switch from an aggregate monetary 
target  to  an  interest  rate  as  the  operative  target.  In  2002,  the  central  bank  of  Peru 
adopted  an  explicit  inflation  targeting  regime,  and  consistent  with  this  regime,  the 
interbank  interest  rate  is  set  as  the implicit  operative  target  (in  2003,  the  interbank 
interest rate is explicitly announced as the operative target). One of the reasons for 
choosing the interbank interest rate is because it is a variable that clearly communicates 
the stance of the central bank monetary policy.
1 During this period, inflation became 
stable and converges to international standard levels. In this context,  the interbank 
interest rate becomes the relevant variable to understand the mechanism of transmission 
of the monetary policy. 
The view of the bank lending channel as a monetary policy transmission mechanism 
is focused on the role of the banks  as either amplifying or slowing down the effects of 
the monetary policy shocks over macroeconomic activity through the lending process 
(supply of credit loans). Kashyap and Stein (2000) argue that empirical studies have not 
completely overcome the fundamental but very difficult problem of disentangling loan 
supply effects from loan demand effects. However, most of the empirical work that has 
been done takes into account that challenge and proposes better identification strategies.  
In the presence of a contracti onary monetary policy shock, some banks would be 
forced to reduce their supply of credit (bank lending channel). Nevertheless, other banks 
would have access to external sources of funding in order to protect t heir portfolio of 
credit loans. The net effect is subject to the financial system capacity to replace the 
                                                 
1 See Rossini and Vega (2007) and Armas et al. (2006) for details.   3 
reduction of financial resources. In other words, the heterogeneity within the banking 
system would help identify the bank lending channel. Controlling for demand variables 
and using bank level data in this paper I test whether the central bank affects the supply 
of banking credit loans. 
Moreover, I test the bank lending channel for a developing country during a period 
of time which is consistent with important structural changes. Gunji and Yuan (2010) 
argue that asymmetric information is more important (more problematic) in developing 
countries in contrast to developed economies because banks have few alternatives for 
deposits as financing resources, and so, the bank lending channel of monetary policy 
should be more important. 
For  the  Peruvian  case,  the  historical  evidence  on  the  effectiveness  of  the  bank 
lending channel is not clear. For example, Quispe (2001) argues that this channel is still 
weak due to two forces mainly opposed to the interior of this channel: on the one hand, 
the greater capital  mobility  and the development  of an internal  capital  market  have 
increased the availability of substitutes for the bank lending, on the other hand, after 
recovering the confidence in the banking system, the greater banking intermediation 
would improve the effectiveness of this channel.
2 
One of the arguments for identifying the effectiveness of the bank lending channel is 
the “flight to quality” situation. Bernanke et al. (1996) define flight to quality as the 
situation in which borrowers facing relatively high agency costs in credit markets will 
bear the brunt of economic downturns. The flight to quality situation is part of  the 
financial accelerator view, and it is complemented with a situation in which reduced 
spending,  production,  and  investment  (given  the  high-agency-cost  borrowers)  will 
exacerbate the effects of recessionary shocks. In this context, banks have comparative 
                                                 
2 Quispe argues that the financing process through the Lima Stock Exchange would have reduced the 
bank lending channel effectiveness. However, the banking system would replace informal mechanisms of 
financing for small firms which in turn would increase its portfolio of customers.   4 
advantages in collecting and processing information as well as the capacity to establish 
long term relationships with their clients. It is also possible that banks are able to offer 
credits to riskier clients and if so, banks that serve clients who do not have any other 
alternative  of  funding  may  face  greater  default  in  credit  loans  in  the presence  of  a 
contractionary  monetary  shock.  If  so,  in  a  credit  rationing  scenario,  firms  who  are 
dependent on bank lending would reduce their production levels even more.
3  
In this paper, the panel estimations follow Kashyap and Stein (1995) who conclude 
that for the bank lending channel to be operational , it is often sufficient that a central 
bank be able to affect the supply of loans  made by commercial banks. My results are 
consistent with a bank lending channel operating in Peru for 200 2 – 2010. The SVAR 
approach follows on the work of Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (1995) and a flight to quality 
scenario. I find evidence against any significant effect of this channel for explaining 
economic activity during this period. 
The advantage of this paper over previous works made for Peru is based on data 
which begins in 2001. This allows the use of the interbank interest rate as the variable 
that  determines  the  monetary  policy  stance.  For  previous  years  to  2001,  it  is  more 
difficult to define which instrument is used by central bank for controlling inflation so I 
am not subject to strong assumptions regarding one instrument or many instruments. 
Another advantage is that this paper incorporates methodological changes in banking 
accounting given by the Superintendence of the Banking System (SBS) in Peru. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In part II, I review the literature 
regarding the bank lending channel in both theory and empirics. Part  III presents a 
representative bank model with a bank lending channel set up. I then in part IV describe 
                                                 
3 The problem for this type of banks continues with potentials problems of asymmetric information, in 
such a way that it is difficult to evaluate their portfolios of loans, so later these banks would experience 
difficulties in replacing their sources of funding.   5 
the data and indicators I use for the estimations made in part V. I conclude the analysis 
on part VI. 
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Modeling Issues and Theoretical Approach 
One of the first theoretical formulations of the bank lending channel problem dates 
back  to  Bernanke  and  Blinder  (1988)  within  an  IS/LM-type  setting.  Bernanke  and 
Blinder argue that the existence of a bank lending channel for monetary transmission is 
based on the premise that the supply of non-deposit sources of funding for banks is not 
infinitely elastic. In their model, banks are not able to replace non-remunerated deposits 
with alternative sources of funding, such as certificate of deposits, new equity, or a 
decrease their bond holdings in response to a monetary tightening.  
Kashyap and Stein (2000) point out that the lending view of Bernanke and Blinder 
(1988) depends on the failure of the Modigliani-Miller proposition for banks in addition 
to borrowers who cannot find perfect substitutes for bank loans; and imperfect price 
adjustment.
4 Stein (1998) claims that his work can be interpreted as the microfundations 
of  Bernanke  and  Blinder  (1988)  model   and  builds  a  model  which  considers  the 
existence of a bank lending channel in a bank asset and liability framework based on 
adverse selection.
5  
Walsh (2003) extends the analysis of Bernanke and Blinder (1988) and analyzes the 
conditions under which the loan supply might be perfectly elastic. Walsh consider the 
portfolio decisions of a representative bank that maximizes profits and concludes that if 
                                                 
4 The non-substitutability between loans and bonds violates the Modigliani–Miller proposition for banks. 
5 Stein develops this argument, observing that many classes of bank liabilities which escape reserve 
requirements are not covered by deposit insurance, and hence are potentially subject to adverse selection 
problems.   6 
loans and demand deposits are complements in the bank’s cost function, then a change 
in reserves that lowers deposits may directly increases the cost of loans, leading to a 
shift in the loan supply function. The shift in the loan supply function would represent a 
distinct bank lending channel leading to a drop in loans. 
Ehrmann et al. (2003), develop a model of the loans market that draws also upon 
Bernanke and Blinder (1988). The solution of their model yields an equation for bank 
loans that relates the response of bank loans to monetary policy both directly (via the 
money channel) and to the bank characteristics (the lending channel). Ehrmann et al. 
accomplish this by adding an explicit demand function for nominal bank loans (which 
introduces aggregate variable like output and prices) and by considering that banks are 
perceived to be risky (which leads to the supplier of non-deposit banks demanding an 
external finance premium).
6 
Also it is important to mention that some theoretical modeling has bee n done in 
order to isolate the effect of cross -sectional differences on the response of banks to 
monetary policy. Peek and Rosengren (1995) model a representative bank which faces a 
loan demand and a large time deposit demand, both of which depend on capit al and 
asset size. This model is extended in Kishan and Opiela (2000)  who assume that the 
mean of the market interest rates for deposits, loans, and securities are directly related to 
the federal funds rate plus a fixed spread. 
Most current empirical work is based on the Ehrmann et al. (2003) and Kishan and 
Opiela (2000) approaches.  
 
2.2 Empirics on Bank Lending Channel and Identification Problem 
                                                 
6 The interest rate that banks pay is the risk free rate (which the authors associate with the FED fund 
rates) plus a premium. The external finance premium depends on a signal of bank’s health, which is 
different for each bank. The higher the health, the lower the external finance premium.    7 
The  first  paper  on  the  existence  of  a  bank  lending  channel  that  focused  on  the 
estimation of reduced-form equations of credit supply using aggregate data is Bernanke 
and Blinder (1992). This paper attempts to provide empirical support to their theoretical 
model presented in Bernanke and Blinder (1988). In general, this strand of the literature 
is criticized because of identification issues of the credit supply responses, given that 
monetary shocks could simultaneously affect the demand and supply for loans. Failure 
to separate these effects leads to an overestimation of the impact of monetary policy on 
the supply of loans.
7 
More recently, different identification strategies have been proposed, including the 
use of bank-level data to account for heterogeneity in the response of banks to changes 
in monetary policy. This approach assumes that banks are price -takers but they react 
differently to monetary policy  depending on the substitutability among  alternative 
sources  of  non -deposit  finance.  Information  on  bank -level  characteristics,  such  as 
capitalization, size, and liquidity, is used to account for heterogeneity. The main papers 
in this line of research are Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000) and Kishan and Opiela 
(2000). 
In their pioneering work, Kashyap and Stein (1995) use bank level data to test for a 
bank lending channel. They find that banks with fewer total assets tend to reduce loans 
relatively more under a tight monetary policy.
8 Moreover, Kashyap and Stein (2000) 
find that the effect of monetary policy is  stronger for banks with less liquid assets. In 
other words, monetary policy has a limited effect on banks that can turn to liquid assets 
to cover the reduction in deposits. Kishan and Opiela (2000) complement previous work 
and emphasize the role of bank ca pital in the bank lending channel  (banks with less 
                                                 
7 See Romer and Romer (1990) for a discussion on endogeneity issues of the early empirical works. 
8 Kashyap and Stein (1995) argue that if deposits fall through tight monetary policy, banks have to reduce 
their loans unless they turn to other methods of financing. It is relatively easier for large-scale banks to 
borrow in interbank markets or issue certificates of deposit. For this reason, even if a tight monetary 
policy is implemented, large-scale banks do not have to reduce loans.   8 
capital tend to reduce loans following tight monetary policy.) Together, the previous 
three  studies  have  stimulated  much  research  on  the  bank  lending  channel  in  other 
economies.
9  However,  as  emphasized  by  Kashyap  and  Stein  (2000),  even  under 
appropriate identification conditions, aggregation makes it difficult to quantify the 
overall impact of monetary policy on credit using evidence based on bank-level data.  
To  avoid  aggregation  problems,  a  strand  of  lite rature  has  favored  the  use  of 
aggregate data and relied on the estimation of vector error correction models. Within 
this framework the supply and demand for loans can be identified by testing for the 
presence  of  multiple  cointegrating  relationships  and  exc lusion,  exogeneity,  and 
homogeneity restrictions. Loan supply and demand can therefore be modeled jointly, 
rather than in a one-equation reduced-form setting. 
Identification of the credit demand and supply equations in this framework relies 
predominantly on the sign of banks’ borrowing and lending rates, as well as that of bank 
capital, coupled with exclusion and homogeneity restrictions imposed on the long-run 
coefficients. The works of Kakes (2000), Calza et al. (2006) and Mello and Pisu (2010) 
use this approach.
10 
Kakes (2000) finds two cointegrating relationships for the case of the Netherlands 
and imposes a homogeneity restriction on the borrowing and lending rates in the supply 
equation. Nevertheless, there does not appear to be strong evidence of a ban k lending 
channel. Calza et al. (2006) find only one cointegrating vector for the Euro-area, which 
they normalize as a loan demand equation on the basis of the signs of the long -term 
                                                 
9 For estimations of the bank lending channel following this view, see Altunbas et al. (2002) for European 
countries and Gunji and Yuan (2010) for the case of China. Gunji and Yuan contribute to this literature 
suggesting the use of profits as another bank characteristic and find that profitable banks tend to be less 
sensitive to monetary policy. They also point out that previous studies are doubtful of the reliability of the 
data and their study is an attempt to uncover the effects of monetary policy qualitatively rather than 
quantitatively. 
10 Mello and Pisu (2010) points out that if the presence of two cointegrating relationships cannot be 
rejected by the data, identification of the supply and demand functions depends on the estimated sign of 
the lending rate, which should be negative in the demand equation and positive in the supply equation, 
and the sign of the borrowing rate, which should be negative in the supply equation.    9 
coefficients. In the same vein, Melo and Pisu (2010) find evidence of two cointegrating 
vectors, which identifies a loan demand and a supply functions for the case of Brazil.  
Coming back to the panel data approach, this strategy requires a large number of 
banks. An alternative approach is to use a panel model that allows the reaction of bank 
loans  to  monetary  policy  to  become  dependent  on  the  bank  characteristics.  This 
approach, suggested by Ehrmann et al. (2003), avoids the problem associated with the 
number of banks and is also used in Hernando and Martinez-Pages (2001), Alfaro et al. 
(2004), Gambacorta (2005),  Mautosek and Sarantis (2009), Altunbas et al. (2009), and 
Tabak et al. (2010).  
Hernando and Martinez-Pages (2001) find evidence against the existence of a bank-
lending channel in Spain while Ehrmann et al. (2003) find that the bank lending channel 
is operating in Germany, France, Italy, and Spain. Ehrmann et al. find that less liquid 
banks react more strongly to shifts in monetary policy than more liquid banks do, but 
bank size and capitalization are generally not important. Mautosek and Sarantis (2009) 
systematically test for the bank lending channel in Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia,  Lithuania,  Poland,  Slovak  Republic,  and  Slovenia  (Central  and  Eastern 
European countries, CEE countries) and find evidence of a bank lending channel in all 
countries,  however  the  strength  of  it  varies  across  countries.  Gambacorta  (2005) 
employs Italian data which covers mainly one monetary policy regime and shows: (i) 
bank scale is unrelated to the impact of monetary policy, and (ii) the impact of monetary 
policy on banks with more liquid assets is weaker.
11 Alfaro et al. (2004) and Tabak et al. 
                                                 
11 Gambacorta (2005) points out that a previous study has different results, and argues that those estudies 
are based on BankScope database which does not control for mergers and acquisitions. Gambacorta used 
Supervisory reports data for Italy and correct for previous data problems.   10 
(2010) find that bank loans supply reacts differently when interest rate changes in Chile 
and Brazil, respectively.
12 
Another approach to the identification of the bank lending channel is to identify 
liquidity  supply  shocks  which  are  exogenous  to  the loan demand side. Peek  and 
Rosengren (1997, 2000) and Schnabl (2010) look for natural experiments that generate 
exogenous liquidity supply shocks. Mian and Khwaja (2010) use firm-level and bank-
level data for the identification of the bank lending channel and  pin down a shock that 
affected the supply of credit loans.  
Peek and Rosengren (1997) use Japanese bank lending operations in the U.S. to test 
the extent to which the strong decline in Japanese stock prices is transmitted to the U.S. 
via U.S. branches of Japanese parent banks.
13 Peek and Rosengren (2000) consider that 
the Japanese banking crisis at the end of the 90s provides a natural experime nt to test 
whether a loan supply shock can affect real economic activity.
14 Schnabl (2010) use the 
1998 Russian default as a negative liquidity shock to the bank system in Peru and find 
an operating bank lending channel.
15 Mian and Khwaja (2010) use data that follows all 
loans made by lenders to borrowing firms in Pakistan, and exploit cross -bank variation 
in liquidity shocks induced by the unanticipated nuclear weapons tests in 1998 made by 
the governments of India and Pakistan.
16  
In general, studies for the U.S. banks provide evidence for the bank lending channel. 
This has been questioned by Ashcraft (2006). Similar to previous studies, Ashcraft 
                                                 
12 Altunbas et al. (2009) adds securitized lending as another bank characteristic that make the lending 
channel stronger, but it is difficult to compare their results with precious work. 
13 This strategy permits the identification of a supply shock to the U.S. bank lending that is independent 
of the U.S. loan demand. 
14 Because the shock was external to the U.S. credit markets, yet connected through the Japanese bank 
penetration of the U.S. markets, this event allows an identification of an exogenous loan supply shock. 
15 Schnabl (2010) uses a point in time and evaluate the effects a year before and after in order to identify 
this channel. 
16 Mian and Khwaja (2010) isolate the causal impact of the bank lending channel by showing that for the 
same firm borrowing from two different banks, the size of loans from the bank experiencing a larger 
decline in liquidity drops by some additional percentage points.   11 
identifies a differential response of loan supply to changes in the federal funds rate 
across banks. However, when the bank data is aggregated to the state level, the loan 
market share of affiliated banks tends to mitigate the negative response of state loan 
growth to changes in monetary policy, while the aggregate response of output to bank 
lending is insignificant and negative.
17 Matousek and Sarantis (2009) follow Ashcraft’s 
strategy for CEE countries, and find the opposite results. The authors argue that it is 
plausible that the deep and liquid financial markets in the U.S. enable firms to replace 
bank loans, while the undeveloped financial markets in the CEE countries prevent firms 
in those countries to do likewise.
18 
The empirical literature on Peru includes the work of Quispe (2001), Loo-Kung and 
Shiva (2003), Carrera and Espino (2006) , and Schnabl (2010) . Quispe uses SVAR 
techniques  and  suggests  that  the  bank  lending  channel  is  neutralized  due  to  the 
possibility of financial resources substitution for part of the banks. The work of Loo -
Kung and Shiva (2003) uses a panel of banks to explain that the monetary policy  does 
not have the capacity to affect the total supply of bank loans  and report evidence of a 
channel in domestic currency only so that, banks of greater relative size are affected to a 
lesser extent by the changes in the monetary policy stance.  Carrera and Espino find a 
relationship between bank’s size and the spread of interest rates, using bank level data. 
While  Quispe’s  work  is  focused  on  the  credit  channel  and  his  conclusions  do  not 
include any explicit measure of the bank lending channel, Loo-Kung and Shiva did not 
provide any test of the effectiveness of this channel and Carrera and Espino leave the 
transmission process from central bank to the banking system to future research. On the 
                                                 
17 On the other hand Dricoll (2004) find evidence of a lending channel by aggregating bank data to the 
state level. The difference between these papers is the use of the interest rate in Ashcraft while Driscoll 
use the money demand for the identification of the monetary policy shock. 
18 Matousek and Sarantis aggregate the bank data up to the country level. To investigate the effectiveness 
of the channel, Matousek and Sarantis estimate an equation that regresses the country output growth on 
country bank loan growth.    12 
other hand, the work of Schnabl lacks explanation about the 1997 Asian crisis and the 
1998 Niño Phenomenon that may hit the Peruvian economy during that period of time 
affecting both, the demand and the supply credit loans. This essay provides updated 
data,  uses  a  different  indicator  of  the  monetary  policy  stance,  and  tests  for  the 
effectiveness of the bank lending channel. 
 
3.  A REPRESENTATIVE BANK MODEL 
 
The model in Ehrmann et al. (2003) allows the identification of the bank lending 
channel. In this model, a profit-maximizing bank decides the optimal amount of credit 
loans. The balance sheet identity of bank i is defined as: 
?? + 𝑆? = ?? + ?? + ??              (1) 
where ?? is the volume of loans, 𝑆? is securities, ?? is the volume of deposits, ?? is the 
level of non-secured funding, and ?? is the capital of bank i. Bank i is on a loan market 
characterized by monopolistic competition. The demand for bank loans is given by: 
??
? = −?0??,? + ?1? + ?2𝑝            (2) 
where ??,? is the bank individual loan rate, y denotes aggregate real output, and  p is the 
aggregate price level. All coefficients are assumed to be positive: ?0,?1,?2 > 0.  
In this model, bank capital is linked to the level of loans as: 
?? = ???                  (3) 
Deposits are secured, but do not pay any interest. They are demanded because of 
their role as a means of payment. In order to avoid any liquidity risk, a proportion of the 
deposits are secured so securities are represented as: 
𝑆? = ???                  (4)   13 
Aggregate  deposit  demand,  on  the  other  hand,  can  be  represented  as  negatively 
related to the interest rate of a risk free asset, ?𝑆 and follows: 
? = −𝜃?𝑆                 (5) 
where 𝜃 > 0 and ?𝑆 also represents the monetary policy rate. 
Since a bank does not remunerate these deposits, all the banks cannot influence the 
amount of deposits that each bank holds (??). Aggregate deposits are exogenous to the 
bank and fall after a monetary tightening (an increase in ? ?). 
On the other hand, any bank has access to an alternative source of funds, which is 
unsecured  and  for  which  has  to  pay  an  additional  interest  rate.  Because  a  bank  is 
perceived  as  a  risky  agent,  the  suppliers  of  unsecured  funding  request  an  external 
finance premium. The interest rate that this bank pays is ??,? which is the risk free rate ? ? 
plus a premium. This premium depends on a bank’s health signal (??) which can be 
observed by all market participants. The higher the ??, the lower the external finance 
premium. The interest rate that a bank has to pay for these funds is: 
??,? = ?𝑆 𝜇 − ???               (6) 
where 𝜇 − ??? ≥ 1  for all individual banks.
19  
Then it follows that the profit of bank i is given by: 
π? = ????,? + 𝑆??𝑆 − ????,? − Ψ?            (7) 
where Ψ? captures bank-specific administrative costs and the remuneration costs for the 
required capital holdings.  
Inserting equations (1) to (5) in (7), and assuming equilibrium in the loan market, 
the profit of bank i can be re-written as: 









𝑝  +  ??? ?𝑆 +   1 − ? ?? −  1 − ? ?? ??,? − Ψ? (8) 
                                                 
19 See Ashcraft (2005) for evidence of bank health from the U.S. at the state level and its relationship with 
economic growth.   14 
Each bank maximizes with respect to ??, so setting the first order condition to zero, 














     (9) 
In  the  “money  view,”  no  informational  asymmetries  imply  no  external  finance 
premium,  hence,  ??,?  is  equal  to  ?𝑆  and  there  are  no  differences  in  the  response  to 
monetary policy across banks.  
In this model, a monetary policy tightening (increase in ?𝑆) leads to a reduction in 
deposits. If a bank increases other sources of funding, it would keep the asset side of 
their balance sheet unchanged. However, the interest rate a bank has to pay for these 
funds was increased. A bank passes at least part of this higher cost to its loan rate (??,?) 
which in turn reduces loan demand. This implies a negative coefficient for ?𝑆 in (9). 
In order for a bank lending channel to operate, the costs for raising non-secured 
funds depend on the degree to which it suffers from informational frictions in financial 
markets. In this model, this implies that different banks face different costs for raising 
non-secured deposits (? > 0). This differentiation would force some banks to reduce 
their  lending  by  more  because  they  have  a  low  health  value.  If  loan  demand  is 
homogeneous across banks a differential loan reaction to monetary policy identifies a 
loan  supply  movement.  The  differential  reaction  can  be  seen  on  the  parameter 
associated  to  the  interaction  term  ???𝑆.  If  this  coefficient  is  significantly  positive, 
monetary policy affects loan supply.  
Considering that bank loans are the main source of financing for firms (specially in 
developing  countries)  and  that  readily  available  substitutes  in  times  of  monetary 
tightening are limited, this representative bank model is as a reasonable benchmark for 
testing the bank lending channel. 
   15 
4.  DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
The data base comes from the banks’ financial statements, available in the official 
web page of the SBS and covers from 2001 to 2010. I also use macroeconomic series, 
which  are  taken  from  the  official  web  page  of  the  Central  Reserve  Bank  of  Peru 
(BCRP). 
In January 2001 the SBS made it effective a new Manual of Banking Accounting, 
and  introduced  different  modifications  in  the  definition  and  treatment  of  diverse 
accounts.  These  changes  make  some  numbers  published  until  December  2000  non-
comparable with the ones published from 2001, for example assets and liabilities of the 
banking system.  
The database inhere covers from 2001 to 2010, monthly frequency for the panel of 
banks estimation, and quarterly frequency for the VAR estimations. When using the 
financial statements of the banks, I consider all banks operating for the whole sample 
period and also excluded any foreign filial (which diminishes the problem associated 
with heterogeneous demand shocks).  
The  total  credit  loans  are  then  discriminated  into  consumption  credit  loans  and 
commercial loans. This distinction of loans would allow a better identification of the 
changes  in  the  supply  of  credit  loans.  I  argue  that  both  series  would  tend  to  have 
different reactions during different moments of the business cycle, as can be shown on 
Figure 2. 
Previous work on bank lending channel tests the presence of the lending channel by 
controlling for three bank characteristics: size, liquidity, and capitalization. Kashyap 
and Stein (1995) and Kishan and Opiela (2000) consider the size of banks as one of 
these characteristics because small banks are more prone to the problem of information   16 
asymmetry than large banks (large banks that can issue market instruments.) Evidence 
provided by Kashyap and Stein (2000) shows that liquid banks can insulate their loan 
portfolios by reducing their liquid assets, while less liquid banks are unable to do so. 
Peek and Rosengren (1995) and Kishan and Opiela (2000) argue that poorly capitalized 
banks  reduce  their  loan  supply  more  than  well  capitalized  banks  after  a  monetary 
contraction (limited ability to tap into uninsured sources of funds.) I also collect proxies 
variables of those bank characteristics. Size is defined as the total of assets of each bank 
in relation to the total of assets in the banking system, liquidity is defined as the ratio of 
liquid assets over total assets, and capitalization is defined as the ratio of capital and 
reserves over total assets in each bank. The summary statistics of size, liquidity, and 
capitalization are reported on Table 1.
20 
I estimate also an indicator of quality of the loans. This indicator is motivated for the 
idea that adverse shocks to the economy may be amplified by worsening credit market 
conditions. Bernanke et al. (1996) interpret the financial accelerator as resulting from 
endogenous changes over the business cycle in the agency costs of lending. At the onset 
of a recession, borrowers facing high agency costs should receive a relatively lower 
share  of  credit  extended  (the  flight  to  quality)  and  hence  should  account  for  a 
proportionally greater part of the decline in economic activity (amplification effect).  
Taking into account that commercial credit loans mainly include corporative credits, 
I estimate a credit quality ratio as: (Consumption credit loans + Small company loans) / 
(Commercial credit loans).
21  
                                                 
20 Liquid assets are defined by the SBS as assets of short-term maturity. This includes cash; funds 
available at the central bank, at other financial institutions, and at foreign first-rate banks; interbank 
available funds; bonds and certificates of deposit issued by the central government and the central bank; 
and certificates of deposit issued by other financial institutions. 
21 Alfaro et al. (2004) take the banking debts of the medium and large firms in Chile and construct a 
low/high quality ratio of banking loans as the consumption credits over the large-firm credits to capture 
the availability of banking credit for households and small companies in relation to the credit granted to 
big companies. Mian and Khwaja (2006) find that large firms in Pakistan completely compensate the   17 
Consumption and small firm credit loans allow the incorporation of the flight-to-
quality effect following the concept of Bernanke et al. (1996). When I compare the 
series consumption loans and small firm loans, both series follow a similar pattern (the 
correlation is around 98 percents).
22 In Figures 3, I present the ev olution of these time 
series. 
The operative financial mechanism of the flight to quality effect would be: indebted 
consumers and specially the small firms would be replaced by big companies (“crowded 
out”).  In this  situation, consumers and small companies  would be restricted to  take 
banking credit loans.  
In order to identify the effect of the monetary policy actions over supply of banking 
credit loans, I need an indicator that is nearly related to the monetary policy stance. For 
the Peruvian  case  I  have the  advantage over previous research  given by  the period 
sample. This fact allows the use of the interbank interest rate as such indicator. Then, a 
positive movement of the interbank interest rate would reflect a contractive monetary 
policy regime.  
Finally, I use different macroeconomic variables both in the panel of banks and in 
the VAR systems: 
  For the panel of banks, I use the annual growth of the real GDP (effects of changes 
in income), and the annual devaluation of the real exchange rate (changes in relative 
prices). Both variables would control for demand conditions. 
  For the VAR systems, I use three additional endogenous variables (in addition to the 
credit  quality  ratio  and  the  interbank  interest  rate):  a  variable  proxy  for 
macroeconomic activity, the consumer prices index, and the real exchange rate. I 
                                                                                                                                               
effect of a liquidity shock by borrowing from more liquids banks while small unconnected firms are 
entirely unable to hedge and face large falls in overall borrowing. 
22 A possible explanation of the high correlation is that many credit loans granted to small and even 
medium companies have been registered as consumption credit loans. Alfaro et al. (2004) find similar 
situation for the Chilean case.   18 
use  real  GDP,  output  gap,  industrial  production,  private  investment,  private 
consumption, and unemployment rate as proxies for macroeconomic activity. Each 
VAR model includes terms of trade, inflation target, external production, and a trend 
tendency variable as exogenous variables.
23  
The described variables are sustained in the fact that Peru is a small open economy 
with announcements of an inflation range from 1994 and an  explicit inflation target 
regime since 2002. In particular, I include terms of trade and external output in order to 
control for external shocks. In this way, if  I find that the credit quality ratio influences 
the economic activity after a monetary policy shock, I would possible interpret that such 
flight-to-quality effect is domestically generated. 
 
5.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
5.1 Monetary Policy Changes in Peru 
In the past ten  years, the Peruvian  economy has experienced different structural 
changes  regarding  monetary  policy.  One  of  those  changes  was  the  switch  from  an 
aggregate monetary target to an interest target as the operative target. Rossini and Vega 
(2007) point out that the switch is the result of achieving levels of inflation similar to 
international standards and of the low correlation between inflation and the growth rate 
of the primary emission of money.  
The transition of such switch can be described as follows: In 2002, the central bank 
adopts an explicit inflation targeting regime, also in 2002 central back switches from 
operative  quantitative  target  in  the  commercial  banks  account  on  central  bank  to  a 
reference band for the interbank interest rate, and in 2003 the interbank interest rate was 
                                                 
23 Inflation target is the center value of the inflation band that the Peruvian Central Bank announces every 
year and external GDP is the growth rate of the U.S. GDP.   19 
set as the new operative target. Figure 4 reports the scheme of the transition of the 
operative target, and Figure 5 displays the interbank interest rate. 
Under this scheme, the central bank announces a reference interest rate (and a band), 




5.2 Identification of the Bank Lending Channel: Panel Data of Banks 
The  empirical  strategy  initially  follows  on  the  tradition  of  Kashyap  and  Stein 
(2000). Bank level data is used to estimate the sensitivity of credit to changes in the 
monetary stance through a reduced-form equation for loan supply, while using bank 
heterogeneity (arising essentially from size, liquidity, and capitalization indicators) for 
identification purposes. 
The central bank must be able to affect the supply of loans so banks must not be 
able  to  offset  the  decrease  in  deposits  (caused  by  open  market  sales)  or  increased 
reserve requirements (by raising funds from any other source), otherwise total supply of 
loans may not change.
25 
I classify loans in three categories: total, consumption, and commercial loans. Such 
classification  allows  the  identification  of  a  flight  to  quality  effect.  Following  on 
Ehrmann et al. (2003) I estimate a panel of 22 banks and use a set of macroeconomics 
                                                 
24 Armas et al. (2006) argues that the main advantages of such switch to the interbank interest rate are: (i) 
it is an instrument that clearly communicates the stance of the monetary policy, (ii) it is a reference for 
other interest rates basically for transactions in domestic currency, (iii) its volatility has been reduced and 
the pass trough to other interest rates has been strength, and (iv) it is a flexible instrument which allows 
central bank to quickly react in difficult situations. 
25 Golodniuk (2006) reviews similar specification of previous empirical work for identification of the 
bank lending channel and use it for Ukraine, while Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) made a review of 
different strategies for bank lending channel for the case of European countries, and take the panel of 
banks approach for the case of Italy. Both of them find evidence in favor of a bank lending channel.   20 
and bank characteristics variables to control for demand and supply sources of variation. 
The empirical approximation is as follows:
26 
??? =   ???−?
?
?=0 +   ???−?
′ ? ?
?=0 + ???−1
′ ? +   ?3?−???−1
′ 𝜑 ?
?=0 + ???   (11) 
where: ??? is the annual growth of total loans (commercial loans or consumption loans), 
??? is a vector of macroeconomics variables (?3?? is the interbank interest rate), ??? is a 
vector of bank specific characteristics variables (liquidity, size, and capitalization), and 
??? is an error term vector. 
I include macroeconomics variables in the panel in order to control for demand 
shocks, whereas the specific bank characteristics would be more associated with the 
different possibilities of asymmetric information in the bank lending market.  
To disentangle loan-supply from loan-demand effects I test for the cross-sectional 
differences  in  the  response  of  bank  loans  to  a  monetary  policy  shock.  If  these 
differences  are  related  to  indicators  of  the  degree  of  asymmetric  information  (size, 
liquidity,  or  capitalization),  they  would  support  the  existence  of  the  bank  lending 
channel.  
If the bank lending channel is operating, there must be a negative and significant 
effect between the coefficients associated to the interbank interest rate and a positive 
effect on the combined effect of the interbank interest rate and bank’s characteristics. In 
the same line, Walsh and Wilcox (1995) show that innovations in the supply of banking 
credit loans are associated to changes in liquidity ratios, in the required reserves, and in 
the imposition of credit controls.
27 
Due to the inclusion  of lags of the dependent variable, I use the GMM estimator 
suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). The differencing procedure ensures efficiency 
                                                 
26 Similar specification can be found in, for example, Altunbas et al. (2009), Matusek and Sarantis (2009), 
Gmabacorta (2005), Alfaro et al. (2004), and Ehrmann et al. (2003). 
27 For Peru, an announcement of increase of the reference interest rate would be reflected in an increase in 
the interbank interest rates, which produces both a reduction of the banking loans due to the smaller 
demand for credit loans and greater supply of credits from more solvent, liquid, and/or bigger banks.   21 
and consistency of the estimates, provided that instruments are adequately chosen to 
take into account the serial correlation properties of the model.
28 
In these estimates, I find evidence that, on average, monetary policy has the capacity 
to affect the total supply of bank credit loans. Table 2  shows that an increase in the 
interbank interest rate reduces the supply of bank credit loans and increases the supply 
of bank credit loans from bigger banks. Also I find that the signs  are as expected for 
demand shocks. 
By type of credit, an increase of the interbank interest rate would reduce the amount 
of commercial bank credits. This effect would be partial  for banks that have bigger 
market participation. This type of credits would increase during expansive stages of the 
economic activity. Also I identify a credit channel in consumer credit loans; those credit 
loans would tend to decrease when there is an increase of the interbank interest rate, 
effect that would be compensated by bigger and more liquid banks.
 29 
In summary, with respect to the coefficients of the explanatory variables: (i) the real 
growth of the GDP coefficient is positive when it is statistically significant; (ii) the 
devaluation  of  the  real  exchange  rate  coefficient  is  negative  when  it  is  statistically 
significant; (iii) the interbank interest rate coefficient is negative in all the cases; and, 
(iv) regarding the interaction of the bank characteristics with monetary policy, liquidity 
coefficient is positive for the consumer credit loans, size coefficient is positive and 
significant in all cases, and capitalization coefficient is not significant in all the cases. In 
Table 3, I show the differentiated effect over banks that have different characteristics in 
the presence of a monetary policy shock. 
These results suggest that the bank lending channel has operated in Peru during 
2002-2010. In addition, the consumption credits seem to capture better the role of the 
                                                 
28 The validity of the instruments is tested with the Sargan test. 
29 Loo-Kung and Shiva (2003) use a similar technique but discriminate by type of currency as his main 
strategy and find a similar result than mine with respect to credit loans in domestic currency.   22 
asymmetric information of the banking credit loans when monetary policy shocks are 
observed. 
 
5.3 Bank Lending Channel: VAR Estimations 
In this section, I test the proposition that the borrowing ratio of “low quality” firms 
relative to those of “high-quality” firms have predictive power for explaining aggregate 
real  variables.  On  this  second  stage  I  consider  the  indicator  of  bank  lending  credit 
quality. Such a variable would incorporate the fact that the numerator would include 
loans of lower quality compared to the denominator which would include credits of 
higher quality. This rate captures the flight-to-quality effect in the credit positioning for 
different  types  of  banks  in  the  presence  of  a  contractive  monetary  policy  shock 
(validation of the credit channel). 
The  VAR  base  model  incorporates  five  variables:  macroeconomic  activity, 
consumer prices, interbank interest rate in domestic currency, credit quality ratio, and 
real exchange rate. The exogenous variables including in this specification are terms of 
trade, objective inflation, external GDP, and a variable of trend tendency. In matrix 
form, the VAR system is defined as: 
?? = ? + ?1??−1 + ?2??−2 + ⋯+ ?𝑝??−𝑝 + ??       (12) 
where ?? is a vector of endogenous and exogenous variables, c is a vector of constants, 
?? is a matrix of coefficients (for i = 1,2, ...p) and ?? is an independent and identical 
distributed vector of errors.  
More evidence in favor of the bank lending channel is the rejection of the null 
hypothesis that the credit variable is not helping to predict macroeconomic activity. This 
hypothesis  can  be  tested  and  be  complemented  with  two  simultaneous  conditions: 
rejection of the null hypothesis that the interbank interest rate is irrelevant to predict the   23 
credit variable, and rejection of the null hypothesis that the variable proxy of economic 
activity is useful to predict the credit variable. 
I estimate six VAR models and each one has a different measure of macroeconomic 
activity:  GDP,  output  gap,  industrial  production,  private  investment,  private 
consumption,  and  unemployment  rate.  A  negative  monetary  policy  shock  would 
decrease the credit quality ratio (flight-to-quality effect) which would strongly affect 
households  and  small  businesses  that  have  banks  as  the  only  source  of  external 
financing. 
The results are presented in Table 4 for six VAR models. Using Granger causality 
tests, these results show that the credit quality ratio helps to predict macroeconomic 
activity variables  in  four  out  of  six estimations. These results  also  indicate that the 
interbank interest rate is not significant in also four out of six estimations for predicting 
macroeconomic activity when the bank lending channel is considered.
30 
On the other hand, macroeconomic activity variables would not help to p redict 
credit quality ratio in all cases, whereas the interbank interest rate would help to predict 
the credit quality ratio in one out of six cases (four out of six cases, if the ten percent of 
statistical significance is considered.) 
These results suggest that causality goes from monetary policy stance to the banking 
credit loans, and from banking credit loans to macroeconomi c activity. This additional 





                                                 
30 The choice of the optimal number of lags for each VAR is done taking into account the information 
criteria tests (Akaike and Schwarz, mainly), lag exclusion tests (test of Wald) and tests of error 
autocorrelation (test of autocorrelation of Portmanteau, Q statistic).   24 
5.4 Relevance of the Bank Lending Channel: SVAR Estimations 
In order to determine any significant effect of the bank lending channel, which in 
this  case  is  identified  by  the  credit  quality  ratio,  I  estimate  a  set  of  autoregressive 
structural  vectors  (SVAR)  and  report  the  impulse-response  functions  to  a  monetary 
policy shock. 
The set of variables are divided in three recursive groups: non policy variables that 
are  contemporaneously  affected  by  the  monetary  policy  variable,  monetary  policy 
variable,  and  non  policy  variables  that  are  not  contemporaneously  affected  by  the 
monetary  policy  variable.  This  specification  allows  a  complete  identification  of  the 
VAR system. 
In other words, the central bank policy reaction function is identified by dividing the 
variables  into  non  monetary  policy  variables  that  cause  a  policy  reaction  and  non 
monetary policy variables that are affected by the policy decisions.
31 
The sequence of events would be: the central bank determines the objective inflation 
and then it sets the monetary policy stance. Then the  non policy variables ordering  
would be: inflation, macroeconomic activity, and credit quality rate of banking loans. 
Assuming that price level is stickier than output and that the credit variable reacts faster 
and contemporaneously to policy decisions than previous variables,  I would have the 
representation suggested for  this  SVAR. In this context, one would expect that a 
structural monetary policy shock would lead to a decrease in the credit quality ratio, as 
represented in Figure 9. 
Using different variables for macroeconomic activity,  I test  if the bank  lending 
channel operated during the sample period following this identification strategy: first 
incorporate the credit quality ratio as an endogenous variable in the VAR system (dark 
                                                 
31 This assumption would be associated with the fact that capital markets react faster than goods and 
services markets when a monetary policy shock occurs, and that help the identification of the VAR 
systems.   25 
lines in impulse-response functions in Figure 10), then define the credit quality ratio as 
an  exogenous  variable  in  the  system  (light  lines  in  Figure  10),  finally  shock  both 
systems with the monetary policy variable (to the interbank interest rate) and test the 
difference between them. 
In  order  to  identify  the  relevance  of  the  bank  lending  channel  I  compare  one 
scenario in which this channel is totally annulled versus a scenario where this channel 
holds. The difference between impulse-responses to a monetary policy shock would 
give  a  measure  of  the  relevance  of  the  bank  lending  channel  for  describing 
macroeconomic activity. 
In order to determine if such difference is statistically significant, I also estimate the 
intervals of confidence at 95 percent for each impulse-response when the bank lending 
channel is annulled. If the impulse-response functions estimated under the assumption 
that the credit quality variable is endogenous fall outside the confidence interval, it is 
possible to  interpret  it as  evidence of  the relevance of the bank lending channel  to 
explain macroeconomic activity variables. 
In five out of six estimations, the results are statistically significant (no significant 
only  for  unemployment.)  In  all  five  cases,  the  use  of  the  credit  quality  ratio  has 
amplifying effects (as suggested in a financial accelerator mechanism.) However in all 
five cases the difference between the two scenarios is not statistically significant enough 
(close to be significant in the cases of output gap, private consumption, and GDP.) 
These results suggest that the use of the credit quality ratio for identifying the evolution 
of macroeconomic activity is not important and the bank lending channel identified in   26 
the previous sections is not necessary for identifying the transmission mechanism of the 
monetary policy.
32 
These results are in line with works of Walsh  and Wilcox (1995) who find that a 
shock of interest rate tends to diminish the amount of bank lending and output, however 
this channel would not have an important role in the economic cycles for the U .S.; of 
Driscoll (2004) who conclude that there is lending channel operating in the U.S. but this 
channel has a small/insignificant effect on output; of Kakes et al. (2002) who conclude 
that  the  bank  lending  channel  is  not  an  important  transmission  mechanism  for 
Germany;
33 and of Quispe (2001) who suggests that the bank lending channel for the 
Peruvian case is neutralized due to the possibility of substitution of financial resources 
on the part of the banks.
34 
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
As Peek and Rosengren (1995) point out, one should not expect the impact on the 
economy  of  monetary  policy  to  remain  constant  over  time  because  the  financial 
condition of firms and banks will vary over a business cycle and from business cycle to 
business cycle. I find evidence of a bank lending  channel in the Peruvian economy 
during the period 2002-2010 i.e. inverse relationship between credit loans and monetary 
policy  stance  and  direct  relationship  between  credit  loans  and  mix  effect  of  bank 
characteristics and monetary policy stance in a panel data approach. I also find that 
                                                 
32 An alternative strategy would be to estimate from the model that includes the credit quality ratio, and 
simulate it with coefficients on the credit quality ration set to zero, as in Bernanke et al. (1997). 
Nevertheless the results are similar following both strategies. 
33 Kakes et al. (2002) argues that the lending channel is strong is banking groups that have a very small 
market share with little consequences for the economy.  
34 On the other hand, the work of Alfaro et al. (2004) and Peek et al. (2003) find significant effects of the 
bank lending channel on macroeconomic activity. Peek et al. (2003) strategy is different and focus on 
explaining inventory movements because this is the component of investment (and therefore of GDP) 
most dependent on bank lending.   27 
causality is running from monetary policy stance to credit loans variables and from 
credit  loans  variables  to  macroeconomic  activity  variables.  However  the  identified 
channel  is  not  an  important  determinant  of  the  monetary  policy  transmission  to 
macroeconomic activity variables. 
With respect to the identification of the bank lending channel, I consider bank level 
data in order to capture the heterogeneity in the reaction of different type of banks. This 
specification allows the identification of a negative effect of an increase of the interbank 
interest rate on the credit loans, result that is consistent with movements in the demand 
and supply of loans so this channel has been operating in the Peruvian economy. I also 
find similar result for the commercial and consumption loans. 
The identification of the bank lending channel is strengthened by a series of VAR 
exercises  and  Granger  causality  tests  in  which  it  is  possible  to  identify  that  the 
directionality of the causality goes from the interbank interest rate to the credit variable, 
and from the credit variable to macroeconomic activity variables. 
When dealing with estimating the relevance of the bank lending channel, I find that 
this channel would not have been important and/or it would have been annulled by other 
effects that may not be fully considered in this work (like market imperfections, firms’ 
balance sheet, strength of the banking system, among others). The strategy of a credit 
quality variable inclusion in a set of SVAR estimations allows the amplification of the 
effects  of  the  monetary  shock  which  is  consistent  with  a  financial  accelerator 
mechanism.  However,  the  difference  in  the  impulse-responses  is  not  statistically 
significant for explaining the behavior of activity variables in the presence of such a 
shock. 
As part of my agenda, I plan on robust these results with co-integrations techniques 
however that exercise is subject to a bigger sample data, to include long-term effects.   28 
Expanding the sample period and comparing two scenarios: when money emission and 
when  the  interest  rate  are  considered  as  operative  target  would  shade  light  on  the 
relevance of the lending channel for the transmission of monetary policy shocks to the 
economy. In line with the work of Mian and Khwaja (2006), the estimation of a firm 
borrowing channel (the inability of firms to smooth out bank lending channel effects by 
borrowing from alternative source of financing) with micro level data linking bank to 
firms would be important in determining how the bank lending channel is an important 
mechanism of transmission. 
 
APPENDIX - MONETARY POLICY AND EXTERNAL CREDIT CONDITIONS 
 
The work of Kashyap et al. (1993) proposes an alternative identification strategy 
that  are  centered  in  the  money  as  a  transmission  mechanism  (which  associates  the 
amount  of  money  to  output);  and  theories  that  are  centered  in  the  bank  loans  as  a 
transmission mechanism (relationship between bank loans and output). The task is how 
to avoid endogeneity problems between money, bank lending, and output. 
In case that the monetary channel is operating, a monetary contraction would induce 
a fall in the output which would cause a decrease in the demand for banking credits. In 
case that the bank lending channel is operating, the contraction of the monetary policy 
would cause a reduction of the bank loans supply. 
Kashyap et al. (1993) make exercises in which in the presence of a contractionary 
monetary policy: 
  If the monetary channel is operating, then a decrease in the output is observed 
which would lead to a decrease in the demand of both banking and non-banking 
sources of debt (for example bonds or commercial papers).   29 
  If the bank lending channel is operating, a decrease for banking credit loans is 
observed  (contraction  of  the  loans  supply).  This  would  be  associated  with  an 
increase in the demand for non-banking sources of debt (like a substitute of the 
banking loans). 
The results that they find are: changes in the monetary policy would alter the ratio of 
bank loans and debt by means of commercial papers,
35 and the changes induced in this 
ratio would affect the investments of the companies.
36 
The data that I use in order to replicate Kashyap et al. (1993) estimations are:  bank 
credit loans, private sector bonds, private investment (in logarithms), and the interbank 
interest rate. I also define the variable banking financing ratio: (banking credit loans) / 
(banking credit loans + private bonds). Figure 11 displays this ratio. 
In the case that the bank lending channel is operating, a contractive monetary policy 
shock  would  decrease in the supply of bank credit loans  and  would decrease the 
composition of private company external financing . This would be associated with a 
greater demand for non banking debt (bonds).
37 
I estimate the following VAR system: interbank interest rate, ratio of banking 
financing and investment. Figure 12 presents the negative effect of a contractionary 
policy shock over the financing ratio. Even though this result is statistically significant, 
the magnitude of the change is small. In the first quarter the ratio tends to increase, but 
after that, it consistently takes negative or close to zero values. This suggest that in the 
presence of a monetary policy shock, firms that have access to the stock exchange will 
                                                 
35 Kashyap et al. (1993) defines the ratio as banking credit loans to the sum of banking credit loans plus 
short term commercial papers. 
36 The exercises that Kashyap et al. (1993) do are of Granger causality for the affirmation of effects of the 
monetary policy towards the ratio of bank loans, whereas they make impulse-response exercises between 
a shock to bank loans and different measures of investment, in which it is generally observed an increase 
of the investment variables. 
37 Huang (2003) proposes a similar exercise and conclude that a higher interest rate induces more bank 
lending to listed U.K. companies, but this effect diminishes if monetary policy becomes tight enough to 
impose severe constraints on bank loan lending. Similar strategy and result can be found in Scharler 
(2008) for U.S. firms.    30 
increase the demand for external sources of funding (increase in the ratio) in order to 
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Characteristic Mean Standard Minimum Maximum Percentile
Error 25 50 75
Size 7.36 9.96 0.04 38.41 0.92 2.67 9.50
Liquidity 29.27 15.74 0.10 97.91 18.89 25.35 36.19
Capitalization 13.76 16.64 3.24 93.61 7.04 9.06 13.05
Sample: 22 banks.
Table 2
Effects of Monetary Policy over Loans Supply
Dependent variable Coefficient Standard error
1 Growth of total loans
Real GDP growth 3.23 * 2.02
Real exchange rate devaluation -4.36 *** 1.53
Interbank interest rate -10.35 ** 5.15
Bank characteristic and Interbank interest rate
Liquidity -12.92 25.90
Size 13.24 ** 7.15
Capitalization 17.44 56.06
2 Growth of commercial loans
Real GDP growth 18.43 *** 4.83
Real exchange rate devaluation -3.34 2.59
Interbank interest rate -14.96 * 8.17
Bank characteristic and Interbank interest rate
Liquidity -49.48 47.27
Size 26.37 ** 12.98
Capitalization -171.16 125.65
3 Growth of consumer loans
Real GDP growth 0.54 1.48
Real exchange rate devaluation -0.15 0.82
Interbank interest rate -19.05 *** 3.33
Bank characteristic and Interbank interest rate
Liquidity 50.34 * 45.96
Size 37.20 *** 12.41
Capitalization -814.19 681.57

















Overall Effect of a Monetary Policy Shock on the Growth Rate of Loans
(by percentile)
Type of loan Liquidity Size Capitalization
25 50 75 25 50 75 25 50 75
Total -10.4 -10.4 -10.4 -10.2 -10.0 -9.1 -10.4 -10.4 -10.4
Consumer -9.5 -6.3 -0.8 -18.7 -18.1 -15.5 -19.0 -19.0 -19.0
Commercial -15.0 -15.0 -15.0 -14.7 -14.3 -12.5 -15.0 -15.0 -15.0
Table 4
Credit Quality and Macroeconomic Activity
VAR Pairwise Grager Causality/Block Exogeneity (Wald tests)
P values from exclusion test
Models classified according Variable excluded from: 1/
to proxies for  Macroeconomic P value Credit quality P value
macroeconomic activity activity equation (percent) ratio equation 2/ (percent)
GDP Interbank interest rate 41.8 GDP 46.3
Credit quality ratio 0.3 Interbank interest rate 5.0
Output gap Interbank interest rate 64.7 Output gap 28.2
Credit quality ratio 95.1 Interbank interest rate 7.1
Industrial production Interbank interest rate 0.6 Industrial production 93.0
Credit quality ratio 3.7 Interbank interest rate 8.4
Private investment Interbank interest rate 92.1 Private investment 26.0
Credit quality ratio 2.5 Interbank interest rate 27.8
Private consumption Interbank interest rate 75.0 Private consumption 95.7
Credit quality ratio 21.1 Interbank interest rate 8.1
Unemployment rate Interbank interest rate 1.3 Unemployment rate 82.5
Credit quality ratio 0.9 Interbank interest rate 28.1
1/ The numbers in the table are the P values for the null hypothesis that some variables contain no 
information for the dependent variable. For each model, we choose the equation that represent both the 
proxy for macroeconomic activity and credit variable (credit quality ratio). I then test, respectively, 
wheather macroeconomic activity and monetary policy do not Granger cause the credit variable. In
other words, if the P value is lower than 5 percent, we can reject the null hypothesis.
2/ Ratio of credit bank loans for consumer and small firms to credit bank loans for commercial firms.  35 
 
 



















































Ene-02 Ene-03 Ene-04 Ene-05 Ene-06 Ene-07 Ene-08 Ene-09 Ene-10
Consumption
Small Firms  36 
 
 















(Untill 2000) (2001-2002) (2002-2003) (since 2003)
Monetary  Operational  Reference band Interbank interest
aggregate quantitative for the interbank rate as the 
target target interest rate operative target
Growth of the Current accounts Upper band: Open market
primary emission of commercial banks Discount interest operations leads
of Money at central bank rate the interbank 
Lower band: interest rate to 
overnight interest the center of the 
rate band
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FIGURE 9.- MONETARY POLICY TRANSMISSION AND THE CREDIT QUALITY RATIO 
 
 
NOTE:  RESPONSE  OF  CREDIT  QUALITY  RATIO  TO  STRUCTURAL  ONE  S.D.  INNOVATIONS  ON  THE 
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FIGURE 10.- MONETARY POLICY TRANSMISSION TO ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
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NOTE:  RESPONSE  OF  SIX  MACROECONOMIC  ACTIVITY  VARIABLE  TO  STRUCTURAL  ONE  S.D. 
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FIGURE 12.- MONETARY POLICY TRANSMISSION TO BANKING FINANCING RATIO 
 
NOTE: RESPONSE OF BANKING  FINANCING RATIO TO STRUCTURAL ONE S.D. INNOVATIONS ON  THE 
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